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Article 
 
The International Criminal Court, the United 
States, and the Domestic Armed Conflict in 
Syria 
 
Eric Engle* 
 
Abstract 
 
This article reviews the various objections made by certain elements 
to U.S. ratification of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) and 
considers alternatives to the ICC. Argues that criticisms of the ICC 
are over-stated and can be answered decisively with good legal 
arguments. The U.S. should continue its close cooperation with the 
ICC and seek to ratify the ICC treaty as part of the U.S. pivot out of 
the failed, expensive, unilateral, and lawless "global war on terror" 
and toward a multilateral rule of law approach, which correctly 
constructs terrorism as an illegal cowardly crime, and not an act of 
war (and thus implicitly lawful if not heroic). This pivot enables the 
U.S. to credibly call on aid from U.S. friends and allies, as well as 
persuading possible allies and dissuading actual enemies. 
                                                
* Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Germany 2013. 
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The International Criminal Court, the United 
States, and the Domestic Armed Conflict in 
Syria 
 
Eric Engle 
 
Introduction 
 
The Rome Statute created the International Criminal Court. 
The United States was one of the prime movers in the negotiation of 
the Rome Statute. However, for a variety of political reasons, U.S. 
accession to the Treaty was limited to signature and was not 
followed up with domestic ratification to make the treaty directly 
binding before U.S. courts. That is, the United States signed but did 
not ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. This 
means that the U.S. has an international treaty obligation under the 
Rome Statute of the ICC not to frustrate the purpose of the treaty, 
which it has signed. However, it also means that any U.S. obligations 
the treaty created are not domestically effective as a part of directly 
enforceable U.S. law. The concerns that led to the non-ratification by 
the United States may at the time have seemed legitimate. However, 
the prudent practice of the ICC, as well as a changed international 
landscape, shows that those concerns were warrantless. Furthermore, 
the ICC can play a part in the pivot of U.S. foreign policy from failed 
unilateralism, which is expensive, isolated, and ineffective, toward 
confident multilateralist globalisation of the rule of law. 
Consequently, the U.S. is engaging the International Criminal Court 
and will continue to deepen its connections to that court.  
The ICC presents an opportunity for multilateral globalisation 
to strengthen human rights, as the eventual fall of the Assad regime 
in Syria may well lead to trials at the ICC. This article argues that the 
United States can and should seek to further empower the ICC by 
making a bi-partisan domestic effort to ratify the Rome Statute. 
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I.  The International Criminal Court (ICC) 
 
A.  The ICC Generally 
 
The International Criminal Court is not a formal organ of the 
United Nations;1 it is an international organization created by an 
international convention, the Rome Statute. Essentially, the Rome 
Statute codifies various recent customary jus cogens crimes of war:2 
genocide, systematic and sustained (as opposed to isolated and 
individual)3 war crimes, crimes against humanity, and systematic 
war-time rape4 (whether as motivation for soldiers or genocidal 
tactic),5 all crimes included in the Rome Statute at the U.S.’ behest.6 
The U.S. also successfully advocated for inclusion of war crimes 
committed during domestic armed conflicts as a basis for ICC 
jurisdiction during the negotiation of the Rome Statute7 under Article 
8,8 as well as various crimes that occur outside of any armed 
conflict.9 
 
                                                
1 About the Court, INT’L CRIM CT,  
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2013); 
Marten Zwanenburg, The Statute for an International Criminal Court and the 
United States: Peacekeepers Under Fire?, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 124, 130 (1999). 
2 LT Aaron M. Riggio et al., The International Criminal Court and Domestic 
Military Justice, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 99, 104 (2011). 
3 David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court, 
93 AM. J. INT’L L. 12, 16 (1999). 
4 Id. at 16-17. 
5Id. at 17 (“include[ing] as crimes against humanity (Article 7(1)(g)) and war 
crimes (Article 8(2)(b)(xxii) and (e)(vii))” and "rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual 
violence of significant magnitude”). 
6 Id. at 16. 
7 Id. at 14 ("Much debate ensued over whether crimes against humanity would 
include crimes committed during an internal armed conflict and crimes occurring 
outside any armed conflict (such as an internal wave of massacres). The United 
States took the lead in advocating both of these propositions and issued a statement 
during the session arguing that "contemporary international law makes it clear that 
no war nexus for crimes against humanity is required.").  
8 Id. at 16. 
9 Id. 
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B.  ICC Jurisdiction 
 
ICC jurisdiction is limited only to those serious and 
systematic crimes which are of mutual and not merely several 
concern to States:10 Article 13(a)-(c) of the Rome Statute provides 
for ICC jurisdiction in cases: 
 
(1) where a state party refers the case to the ICC prosecutor (referral 
- including "self referral"), 
(2) by resolution the U.N. Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII 
of the Charter of the United Nations, or  
(3) by the Prosecutor's own motion (proprio motu).11  
 
Furthermore, 
 
A national of a state which is not a member of the ICC 
can be subject to ICC jurisdiction in four different 
situations: (1) if the person commits an ICC crime on 
the territory of an ICC member state; (2) if the situation 
is referred to the ICC by a S.C. resolution under 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter;  (3) if the person's 
home state (a non-party) accepts the jurisdiction of the 
ICC and refers the case to the Court; or (4) if the ICC 
crime is committed on the territory of a non-member 
state, but the state with territorial jurisdiction accepts 
the jurisdiction of the ICC and refers the case to the 
Court."12 
 
Only natural persons (as opposed to corporations or states) 
                                                
10 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5, July 1, 2002, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 (stating that “[J]urisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.”).  
11 Justin H. Whitten, They're Getting Away With Murder: How the 
International Criminal Court Can Prosecute U.S. Private Security Contractors for 
the Nisour Square Tragedy and Why It Should, 11 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. 
REV. 503, 509  (2012). 
12 Stephen Eliot Smith, Definitely Maybe: The Outlook for U.S. Relations with 
the International Criminal Court During the Obama Administration, 22 FLA. J. 
INT'L L. 155, 171 (2010). 
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may be subjected to ICC jurisdiction.13  Heads of state do not enjoy 
immunity before the ICC.14  
ICC jurisdiction is “complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions.”15 That is, ICC jurisdiction is intended to cover only 
places where there is no State power (the high seas, failed states) or 
where no effective domestic prosecution is possible (whether due to 
corruption or oppression).16  All these jurisdictional preconditions 
mean that the ICC will likely be primarily a Security Council court.17  
 
C.  U.S. Accession to the Rome Statute 
 
Although the U.S. has not ratified the Rome Statute, the ICC 
was inspired by U.S. initiatives, and the U.S. was heavily involved in 
the negotiations leading to the creation of the ICC. The Nuremburg 
and Tokyo tribunals, which are among the inspirations of the ICC, 
were essentially U.S. creations. At the end of the Cold War, U.S. 
scholars18 and diplomats successfully argued for the implementation 
of a permanent international criminal court at the United Nations.19 
As a result, over 100 countries became parties to the Rome Statute.20 
Like the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the 
                                                
13 Id. at 159. 
14 The ICC at a Glance, INT’L CRIM CT.,  
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/ICCAtAGlanceEng.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2013).  
15 Smith, supra note 12, at 159. 
16 Id. 
17 Riggio, supra note 2, at 106-107. 
18 M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: 
The Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. 
RTS. J. 11 (1997); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 443 
(1999). 
19 U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 88th plen. mtg. at 5, U.N. DOC. A/51/207 (Jan. 16, 
1997) (“Decid[ing] further that a diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries shall 
be held in 1998, with a view to finalizing and adopting a convention on the 
establishment of an international criminal court.”). 
20 David H. Lim, Beyond Kampala: The U.S.' Role in Supporting the 
International Criminal Court's Mission, 39 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & COM. 441, 
442-443 (2012); Brendan Leanos, Cooperative Justice: Understanding the Future 
Of the International Criminal Court Through its Involvement in Libya, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2267, 2279 (2012); Smith, supra note 12, at 171. 
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U.S. signed the ICC treaty,21 but never ratified that treaty.22 Legally 
speaking, the United States is obligated as a matter of international 
law to respect its commitments under the Rome Statute; however, 
with no ratification, the treaty has no direct effect in domestic U.S. 
law or before U.S. courts.23 International law does not obligate states 
to transpose treaties they have signed into their domestic legal 
order.24  
Although the ICC and CRC treaties are not domestically 
directly effective they create U.S. international obligations. 
Furthermore, the ICC treaty, like the CRC, is taken by U.S. courts as 
evidence of customary international law, whether as evincing opinio 
juris or as evidence of state practice. Customary international law, 
unlike treaty law, is directly effective in common law countries' 
courts and does not require transposition or ratification to be applied 
by U.S. judges. Thus, while the U.S. has no direct obligations under 
the treaty before domestic courts, the treaty has persuasive 
evidentiary value of the state of customary international law, and as 
such, is evoked before U.S. courts. A similar situation, incidentally, 
also occurred with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties25 
and the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS). The U.S. never 
ratified those treaties, yet they are all evoked before U.S. courts26 as 
codifications of customary international law, i.e. as evidence of 
binding international law. Customary international law is binding 
domestic law in the common law countries.  
 
                                                
21 WILLIAM SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 28 (Cambridge, 4th ed. 2011). 
22 Whitten, supra note 11, at 509; LAURA M. OLSEN, ET AL., U.S. POLICY 
TOWARD THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: FURTHERING POSITIVE 
ENGAGEMENT, REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE, AM SOC’Y INT’L L. V 
(2009). 
23 See, e.g., id. at xi. . 
24 ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 83 (2000). 
25 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify 
International Criminal Court Treaty, ASIL INSIGHTS (May 2002), available at 
http://www.asil.org/insigh87.cfm. 
26 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 270 (2nd Cir. 2007); 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 
2009) (holding JCC evidence of accomplice liability as customary international 
law).  
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 II. U.S. Objections to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court 
 
The U.S. has, at different times and to different extents, raised 
a variety of objections to the ICC. These objections are analyzed 
below and will be shown to be unpersuasive in law or in fact.  
 
A.  Inclusion of the Crime of Aggression 
 
One recurrent but ill-founded U.S. criticism of the ICC Rome 
Statute is its inclusion of an ambiguous and ill-defined27 crime of 
aggression.28 The Nuremburg International Military Tribunal (IMT) 
defined crimes against peace as “planning, preparation, initiation or 
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international 
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan 
or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.”29 
Even if the substantive elements of the crime become clearer in that 
light, the question of who exactly is to be held responsible for that 
crime (the state? organs of state? the head of state? ministers?) 
remain unanswered.30  
The political critique of inclusion of the crime of aggression 
is that its inclusion enables U.S. critics to argue that President 
George W. Bush planned and committed a war of aggression against 
Iraq to seize Iraqi oil. This illustrates the U.S. concern over frivolous 
political accusations and the bases of such accusations. The price of 
                                                
27 U.S. S. COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, REVIEW 
CONFERENCE, KAMPALA, UGANDA, MAY 31 – JUNE 11, 2010, S. DOC NO. 111-55, AT 8 
(2d Sess. 2010) (“Defining aggression as [t]he planning, preparation, initiation, or 
execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct 
the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its 
character, gravity and scale, constitutes manifest violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations,” and “[t]he use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations”).  
28 U.N. Doc. RC/Res.6, at 19 (June 11, 2010).  
29 Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, annex art. 
VI(a), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288.  
30 Chance Cammack, The Stuxnet Worm and Potential Prosecution by the 
International Criminal Court Under the Newly Defined Crime Of Aggression, 20 
TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 303, 304-305 (2011). 
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unilateralism is the loss of legitimacy. Had President George W. 
Bush pursued a multilateralist policy, as President George H. W. 
Bush did, there would have been no question about U.S. motives in 
Iraq. The price of unilateralism was also material: the economic costs 
of the Second Gulf War run around a trillion dollars. In contrast, the 
first gulf war was funded entirely by U.S. allies who were persuaded 
that opposing the war-like dictator was in their own interests. George 
H. W. Bush, due to multilateralism, obtained significant financial 
and military support from U.S. allies, unlike George W. Bush.  
The legal critique of the crime of aggression is that it violates 
the principle of nullum crimen sine lege due to vagueness,31 over-
breadth,32 and circularity.33 Namely, it is unclear what conduct is 
covered (vagueness), too much conduct is covered (overbreadth), and 
the reasons the conduct is covered are not adequately explained 
(circularity: e.g., the conduct is prohibited because it is forbidden). 
Thus, the legal critique is that the inclusion of the crime of 
aggression violates the prohibition of ex post facto law 
(Rückwirkung),34 although some contend these criticisms are over-
done.35 
The most cogent critique of the crime of aggression is 
presented by Harold Hongju Koh. Koh states: 
 
I think one fundamental point is that the crime of 
aggression is different from the other three crimes in a 
                                                
31 Riggio, supra note 2, at 110. 
32 Michael J. Glennon, The Blank-Prose Crime of Aggression, 35 YALE J. 
INT'L L. 71, 74 (2010). 
33 Grant M. Dawson, Defining Substantive Crimes Within the Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: What Is the Crime of 
Aggression?, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 413, 421-36 (1999) (discussing 
the Nuremberg Charter which allowed prosecution of individuals, and the U.N. 
General Assembly's Resolution 3314 which defines as aggression acts of States). 
34 Glennon, supra note 32, at 72.  
35 Jennifer Trahan, A Meaningful Definition of the Crime of Aggression: A 
Response to Michael Glennon, 33 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 907, 909 (2012); Ian Hurd, 
How Not to Argue Against the Crime of Aggression: A Response to Michael 
Glennon 1, 6 (Buffett Ctr. for Int'l & Comp. Stu., Working Paper No. 10-001, 
2010), available at  
http://www.cics.northwestern.edu/documents/workingpapers/Buffett_10-
001_Hurd.pdf.  
 155 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. Vol. XIV 
 
 
couple of respects . . . [t]here have been hundreds of 
prosecutions for genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity. There have only been two 
prosecutions for wars of aggression, namely 
Nuremberg and Tokyo. Both of those happened before 
there was a UN system. There's been no successful 
prosecution for an act of aggression alone. And the 
question is, since we're making international criminal 
law for the real world, before you lock in the crime 
forever, you want to make sure that as a legal matter 
you've got it right."36  
 
Even if the substantive elements of the crime become clearer 
in that light, the questions of who exactly is to be held responsible 
for that crime remain unanswered.37  
Although the criticism of the inclusion of the crime of 
aggression is understandable, claims of aggression will not be 
justiciable before 2017. During that time, the criticisms – and 
adequate responses to them – can be developed. Furthermore, "the 
[Rome] Statute allows a state that has ratified the Rome Statute to 
exclude the Court's jurisdiction for acts of aggression committed by 
its nationals simply by making a declaration to the ICC Registrar that 
it does not accept the Court's jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression."38 Thus, U.S. citizens are exempt from aggression 
jurisdiction.39  
In sum, U.S. critiques of the inclusion of the crime of 
aggression are ill-founded. Moreover, the inclusion of the crime of 
aggression actually is not entirely bad for the U.S. Rather, it is in the 
U.S.’ interest to develop an understanding of the meaning of 
"aggression" because of the problem of "cyber warfare,"40 i.e. state 
sponsored network disruption of telecommunications—actions which 
                                                
36 Harold Hongju Koh & Stephen J. Rapp, US Engagement With The ICC and 
The Outcome Of The Recently Concluded Review Conference, U.S. DEP’T ST. 
(June 15, 2010), available at  
http://www.state.gov/s/wci/us_ releases/remarks/143178.htm. 
37 Cammack, supra note 30, at 304-305. 
38 Smith, supra note 12, at 171. 
39 Trahan, supra note 35, at 911. 
40 See Cammack, supra note 30, at 303. 
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both Russia (in Estonia in 2006) and China (more recently) have 
been accused of, with some accuracy. Industrial espionage might 
also qualify as aggression. 
 
B.  The ICC Prosecutor's Power to Prosecute on His or Her Own 
Motion (Proprio Motu) 
 
Another U.S. criticism of the Rome Statute was that it vests 
prosecutorial power and discretion in a supposedly unaccountable 
court. Namely, the ICC prosecutor may initiate prosecution by his or 
her own motion (proprio motu). There were concerns that this 
practice would lead to a flood of complaints41 and/or selective 
politicized prosecutions.42 In practice, however, those fears have not 
materialized and the court has behaved responsibly.43 The Court 
checks prosecutorial power and defends due process rights.44 For 
example, when confronted with the fact of isolated but literally grave 
human rights violations by British soldiers, the ICC concluded that 
the killings, which were terrible and did occur, were not sufficiently 
systematic to overcome the presumption of complementarity: the 
soldiers were better prosecuted by the Crown.45 It is thus extremely 
unlikely that the ICC would ever try any U.S. citizen.46 This 
criticism, like others, shows itself to be merely theoretical and in 
practice unrealistic and unfounded. 
 
C.  The Absence of Jurisdiction over Terrorism 
 
Another criticism of the ICC is that the Rome Statute does 
not provide jurisdiction over acts of terrorism,47 not only because the 
                                                
41 Zwanenburg, supra note 1, at 136. 
42 See Riggio, supra note 2, at 112-14. 
43 Smith, supra note 12, at 177. 
44 Olsen, supra note 22. 
45 Smith, supra note 12, at 169-170. 
46 Id. at 177-178. 
47 Aviv Cohen, Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal Court: 
Reevaluating an Unused Legal Tool to Combat Terrorism, 20 MICH. ST. INT'L L. 
REV. 219, 223 (2012), available at  
http://msuilr.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Cohen-Macro-for-publisher-after-
Hazels-edits.pdf.  
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crime of terrorism is so contentious and ill-defined under customary 
international law,48 but also because the crime of terrorism is not one 
of the core crimes that were of mutual concern to the States, 
internationally.49 However, some have argued that terrorism is 
analogous to piracy and by analogy should be seen as a customary 
international crime.50 The crime of terrorism is prohibited by various 
multilateral international treaties. Those treaties usually feature 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, police cooperation clauses, and even 
extradition provisions. The treaty-based crime of terrorism will likely 
grow into customary international law. If it does, and as it does, the 
concern that the Rome Statute does not expressly include terrorism 
will fade. Alternatively, the Rome Statute might yet be amended to 
include the international crime of terrorism. 
 
D.  The Democratic Legitimacy of the ICC 
 
A more interesting critique of the ICC is its legitimacy in 
terms of democratic input.51 That critique is related to claims that the 
court is "neo-imperialist." However, it is not particularly realistic to 
expect or demand democratic legitimation of international 
institutions in failed states, which generally are the sources of 
criminal defendants before the ICC. 
Another argument about the legitimacy of the court is the fact 
that citizens of non-signatory states may be called before the court. 
However, the ICC claims jurisdiction only over natural persons, not 
states or even corporations. Thus, non-party states are not bound by 
the treaty. States take criminal jurisdiction over non-citizen natural 
persons regularly, and that which is not forbidden to a state would 
not be forbidden to an international organization created by states.52 
For these reasons "the [U.S.] Task Force does not consider the ICC’s 
                                                
48 Id. at 224 ("The first and foremost obstacle to the inclusion of terrorism in 
the Rome Statute was the lack of a clear and universally accepted definition of 
what constitutes terrorism, including dissatisfaction with the proposed definition in 
the text of the draft.”). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 225. 
51 See Marlies Glasius, Do International Criminal Courts Require Democratic 
Legitimacy?, 23 EUR. J. INT'L L. 43 (2012). 
52 Olsen, supra note 22, at ix. 
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jurisdiction over nationals of non-party States to be in conflict with 
principles of international law."53  
E. The Constitutionality of the Rome Statute 
 
Much of the criticism of the ICC from the U.S. perspective 
focuses on constitutional concerns,54 such as due process or the 
constitutional admissibility of a treaty in possible conflict with the 
U.S. federal constitution.55 Thus, during negotiations, the U.S. put 
serious effort into making sure that the Rome Statute would cohere 
with the U.S. Constitution's due process requirements, notably in 
Parts 5-8 of the treaty.56 U.S. critics of the ICC nevertheless argue 
that the Rome Statute does not guarantee, e.g., the right to a prompt 
public trial by jury with the right to confront and cross-examine the 
accuser and witnesses.57 Those rights of the accused are vital, and the 
concern is understandable. However, those same rights are 
recognized in civilianist jurisdictions under the rubric of "droits de la 
défense" and thus are part of the general principles of law, a source 
of binding international law.  France incidentally shared the U.S. 
concern over the absence of a mens rea requirement.58 Consequently, 
the "Elements of Crimes" were amended to include a requirement of 
culpa, i.e. mens rea.59 Similar U.S. procedural guarantees (e.g., nulle 
crimen sine lege) were also written into the text of the Rome 
                                                
53 Id. at x. 
54 E.g., Smith, supra note 12, at 180-81. 
55 Olsen, supra note 22, at xii (stating that "[t]wo main constitutional 
objections to the Rome Statute have been raised: 1) the ICC does not offer the 
same due process rights as does the U.S. Constitution; and 2) ratification would 
contravene Article 1, Section 8 and Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, 
dealing with the establishment of domestic courts."). 
56 Scheffer, supra note 3, at 17. 
57 Lim, supra note 20, at 452; Kristafer Ailslieger, Why the United States 
Should Be Wary of The International Criminal Court: Concerns Over Sovereignty 
and Constitutional Guarantees, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 80, 94 (1999), available at 
http://www.washburnlaw.edu/wlj/39-1/articles/ailslieger-kristafer.pdf.  
58 John D. Van der Vyver, The International Criminal Court and the Concept 
of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law, 12 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. R. 57 
(2004). 
59 Lim, supra note 20, at 458. 
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Statute.60  
Thus, general claims that the Rome Statute somehow 
contradicts the U.S. Constitution are without merit and can be easily 
met, legally speaking.61 Laws are presumed to be consistent with 
each other and are so interpreted. Even when laws manifestly 
conflict in theory, a law will be upheld as constitutional unless it is in 
fact applied unconstitutionally; moreover, where a law is in fact 
unconstitutional and applied unconstitutionally the doctrine of 
severability indicates that a court ruling that two laws are in conflict 
will delimit its decision as narrowly as possible so as to leave as 
much as possible of both laws intact. Thus, the constitutional 
objections to the ICC are ill-founded. 
 
1. Jurisdiction by the ICC Over U.S. Citizens and on U.S. 
Territory 
 
One of the express reasons the U.S. decided not to ratify the 
Rome Statute was the fear that ratification would expose U.S. 
soldiers and the U.S. government to frivolous62 political prosecutions 
before the ICC.63 Unlike most other States, the U.S. provides large 
numbers of troops, supplies, and support for international peace-
keeping and peace-making operations, which other states cannot or 
will not provide.64 Thus, the U.S. is more exposed to the ICC than 
most other countries in this regard. At the same time, there are 
definite instances of U.S. abuses, which would be violations, notably 
by private military contractors.65 While isolated U.S. military abuses 
of human rights are cases of "bad apples," i.e. of individual acts, and 
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not of government policies, the fact is that the U.S. has engaged in 
torture of captured terrorists as a state policy. So, while military 
prosecutions might never occur before the ICC, the same might not 
be said of the CIA or its independent contractors. We should never 
forget that the U.S. has also committed war crimes such as the My 
Lai massacre during the Vietnam War and the Abu Ghraib prison 
abuse after the Iraq war. Nazis were not the only people to use 
humans for deadly medical experimentation; the U.S. also conducted 
deadly experiments on human test subjects; but the U.S. test subjects 
poisoned with plutonium did not even know they were being used as 
lab rats.66 Exposing criminals to liability for their criminal acts is the 
nature of justice. However, the Rome Statute permits States to 
invoke a national security exemption to their cooperation. Thus, the 
critique that ratification of the Rome Statute may result in the ICC 
having a form of “universal jurisdiction”67 over actions by U.S. 
citizens in the United States68 is not well founded. Furthermore, if 
there were any such conflict the time to address that conflict would 
be when it arises in the concrete case, not as an abstract (and frankly 
very unlikely) theoretical possibility.  
As a factual matter it is extremely unlikely that CIA agents or 
contractors will ever even be accused of crimes let alone convicted, 
whether before the ICC or U.S. courts. The question is whether the 
U.S. thinks the trade-off of increased legitimacy and effective 
foreign policy in the real world is worth the risk of theoretical 
liability. Given that the U.S. is over ten years and counting into a 
"global war on terror" with a resulting massive debt and 
underperforming economy, the calculus should be obvious. The 
substantive crimes, except perhaps aggression, are already illegal 
under U.S. military law.69 U.S. ratification of the ICC treaty (the 
Rome Statute) would have positive effects in terms of affirming the 
rule of law and restoring the United States as champion of human 
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67 Lim supra note 20, at 452. 
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rights, the “heroes of Nuremberg”.70 It would strengthen 
multilateralism, improving the U.S. position in the global struggle 
against poverty, lawlessness, and the resultant terrorism. 
 
2. Ratification of the ICC would be Constitutional 
 
U.S. case law makes it fairly clear that ICC ratification would 
be constitutional. Ross v. McIntyre71 holds that U.S. constitutional 
guaranties in the international context are proportional to actual 
exercise of U.S. state power and the practical exigencies of 
diplomacy. Neely v. Henkel72 makes it even clearer that the U.S. 
constitutional guarantees are conditioned in the international context 
by the treaty power. So, for example, it is constitutionally 
permissible for the U.S. President via a ratified treaty to arrogate to 
exclusive federal control an area of concurrent federal and state 
jurisdiction (State of Missouri v. Holland).73 Thus, the constitutional 
constraints on U.S. foreign policy are simply not sufficient to warrant 
claims that the ratification of the ICC would be unconstitutional. The 
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, may 
constitutionally employ the treaty power to shape U.S. international 
obligations a fortiori because the U.S. President is plenipotentiary in 
foreign relations.  
 
a. Reservations 
 
Usually a reservation to the treaty would allow the U.S. to 
insulate itself constitutionally by affirming that the treaty shall not be 
interpreted or applied as inconsistent with any provision of the 
United States constitution. However, the Rome statute explicitly 
forbids reservations.74 Instead, it allows "declarations." Usually the 
term "declaration" is not a binding positive rule that may be applied 
to cases; rather, declarations are mere political assertions. As such 
they are not binding law on future cases. For example, the French 
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Declaration of the Rights of Man was a political (and thus non-
justiciable) document. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man 
was never seen as creating justiciable legal rights or duties. Likewise, 
the U.S. Declaration of Independence was a mere assertion, not a 
legally operative command or general rule; it was a political 
declaration, not a legally justiciable instrument. The U.S. Declaration 
of Independence is only of interpretative value, and like the preamble 
to the U.S. Constitution or the German fundamental law, it does not 
itself create positive rights and duties. It merely confirms other 
existing rights and duties and guides their interpretation. Thus, 
relying on "declarations" in the Rome Statute to address U.S. 
concerns is a weak argument.  
 
b. Complementarity 
 
The ICC is a court of “last resort.”75  The principle of 
complementarity76 guarantees that the ICC shall only be resorted to 
after exhaustion of local remedies at the State level: "the Court's 
authority is only exercised when a nation is unable or unwilling to 
independently investigate and prosecute an alleged crime . . . the 
Rome Statute denies the ICC jurisdiction if, after expressing its 
intent to investigate a suspect, the suspect's country pushes forth with 
an investigation on its own."77 The principle of complementarity has 
proven itself in practice and should allay any concerns over the 
legality of the ICC. 
 
c. The American Service-Members’ Protection Act (ASPA) 
 
During the first term of the President George W. Bush, the 
U.S. sought to oppose and avoid the ICC, notably by passing the 
American Service-Members’ Protection Act of 2002 (ASPA) and by 
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76 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17-19, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90.  
77 David H. Lim, supra note 20, at 453. 
 163 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. Vol. XIV 
 
 
seeking bilateral non-prosecution agreements.78 This policy proved 
ineffective at securing U.S. interests, so the U.S. no longer pursues 
so-called Article 98 agreements.79 However, "if the United States 
decides to cooperate with the ICC, the President will have to provide 
a waiver under ASPA’s section 2003(c) or employ ASPA’s section 
2015 in order to do so."80 
 
E.  Summation: International Relations "Realism" 
 
Most of the critiques of the ICC81 are proposed by people 
who advocate a flawed theory - international relations "realism" (“IR 
Realism”). IR Realism is the idea that States are rational power 
maximizers motivated by their own interest, which is defined in 
terms of national security, i.e. Realpolitik. The principal architect of 
the self-destructive U.S. efforts to oppose the United States inspired 
ICC, John Bolton, argues that “[w]hy should anyone imagine that 
bewigged judges in The Hague will succeed where cold steel has 
failed? Holding out the prospect of ICC deterrence to the weak and 
vulnerable amounts to a cruel joke.”82 Bolton, like most IR "realists,” 
short-sightedly failed to consider the persuasive power of attractive 
rules; we obey laws, and ensure that others obey them too, because 
they are attractive to us and in our own interest, they guarantee our 
well being. IR "realists" such as Bolton also underestimate or even 
ignore the productive synergies generated by multilateralism due to 
network effects, economies of scale, and reduced transaction costs. 
The literal bankruptcy of realism as a foreign policy is demonstrated 
from the fact of the failure of the various "wars against terror" to do 
other than generate a massive budget deficit. Thus:  
 
“By the time the U.S. came under severe pressure 
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to drop its proposal for an ad hoc ‘Sudan Tribunal’ to 
handle what it termed the ‘genocide’ in Darfur, it was 
clear that the U.S. hostility towards the ICC was not 
achieving it purpose. Far from undermining the ICC, 
the Bolton-inspired policies appeared to enhance its 
credibility.”83 
 
This explains why the U.S. is pivoting from a policy which 
opposed the ICC it inspired toward one of active cooperation with 
the ICC. 
 
III. U.S. Cooperation with the ICC: Observer Status and 
Constructive Engagement 
 
The U.S. is successfully pivoting from a foolish and self-
destructive policy of unilateralist confrontation to a nuanced sensible 
policy of multilateral cooperation with the ICC: 
 
[R]atification would directly advance U.S. national 
security interests. The International Criminal Court 
could strengthen America's efforts in stabilizing post-
conflict regions as the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia did in the Balkans. ... by 
working with the ICC, the United States would have 
additional diplomatic tools in dealing with countries 
such as Sudan, where the use of force may not be 
“politically or practically feasible.84 
 
A U.S. dignitary stated: “Our long-term vision is the 
prevention of heinous crimes through effective national law 
enforcement buttressed by the deterrence of an international court.”85 
The United States has had and will continue to have a compelling 
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interest in the establishment of a permanent international criminal 
court (ICC).86 Although the United States did not ratify the Rome 
Statute, it is an observer thereto87 and has committed itself to help 
countries to establish legal infrastructure needed for domestic 
prosecutions and to cooperate with the ICC investigation of the 
Lord's Resistance Army (“LRA”) in Africa.88 The current 
administration recognizes that "[t]he United States has had and will 
continue to have a compelling interest in the establishment of a 
permanent international criminal court (ICC)"89 and supports the ICC 
efforts in Libya and Darfur.90 For its part the EU is seeking to engage 
the U.S. into participation in the ICC.91 One can envision the 
progressive realization of the ICC Rome Statute into customary 
international law as well as an eventual U.S. ratification of the ICC 
Statute.  
However, if the U.S. does not ratify the ICC Rome Statute, 
are there other alternatives to the problems of violations of 
international law?  
 
IV. Alternatives to the ICC 
 
Given that the U.S. has not yet ratified the Rome Statute of 
the ICC, we can still fairly ask about alternatives and work-arounds 
to that gap in global governance; U.S. non-participation in the ICC is 
not as problematic as the U.S. decision not to join the League of 
Nations but should be seen similarly: as an offer of a free-pass for 
dictators and tyrants which may well lead to avoidable wars and lost 
global productivity.  
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A.  Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 
 
Whether as an alternative or as a complement to criminal 
prosecutions, truth commissions seek to establish what really 
happened so that the victims and society can move on from the crime 
to attain some semblance of a normal stable and productive life.92 
One goal of international criminal law is reconciling conflicting 
parties so that they can escape their conflict and enter into productive 
peaceful relations.93 Obviously, truth and reconciliation commissions 
cannot do all that is needed, but they will equally be appropriate in 
certain times and places. The Rome Statute may even evolve to 
account for the possibilities of truth and reconciliation commissions.  
 
B.  Tribunals 
 
The predecessors to the ICC were the various international 
tribunals, such as the IMTs at Nuremburg94 and Tokyo, and after the 
Cold War, the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR).95 That the U.S. was behind those 
efforts was evident and that the U.S. should be a staunch supporter of 
the ICC is a logical extrapolation from history.96 International 
Tribunals were not, however, used in Iraq after the Second Gulf War. 
While some called for the ICC to be invoked in Iraq, neither Iraq nor 
the United States has accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC.97 Saddam 
Hussein was eventually tried by a court established by the 
provisional government of Iraq, not the ICC, in a trial that has been 
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criticized by various human rights organizations (notably Human 
Rights Watch and Amnesty International). Nor were international 
tribunals used in Sudan.98  
 
 Why resort to international tribunals? Are national courts 
sufficient, or even more effective? Generally that may be the case, 
but exceptionally it is certainly not the case, as can be seen in the 
case of Iraq where the national tribunal has been characterized as 
procedurally unfair due to bias. The advantage of international 
instances over national courts is that the judges in such cases are 
impartial, as they are not members of any of the conflicting 
factions.99 Further, international proceedings garner greater publicity, 
and thus will have greater deterrent effect than purely national 
proceedings.100 Moreover, international crimes concern issues of 
mutual and not merely several concern, affecting the entire world, 
which legitimates the application of international criminal law.101  
If international tribunals are good, why have an ICC? 
Although international tribunals are good, they are not good enough. 
The trouble with tribunals is that they are temporary and thus their 
legitimacy and long-term contribution to the formation of 
international law is questionable.102 "A permanent international 
criminal court would additionally eliminate the need to invest in the 
establishment of ad-hoc tribunals anytime a post-conflict 
investigation is mandated."103 
 
C.  Current Events: Arab Spring and the ICC 
 
The historic experiences with international tribunals and the 
ICC set the stage for the reactions to the "Arab Spring." One can 
rightly ask how international law will and should react to the 
problems of governance presented by revolutionary reactions 
instigated by outside powers to authoritarian governments? 
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1. Libya 
 
Libya may be a hopeful sign. Libya is not a state party to the 
Rome Statute.104 While Russia clearly opposed the misuse of the 
U.N. Security Council Resolution as a justification for armed 
intervention into Libya, Russia nonetheless supported the U.N. 
Security Council referral of Libyan cases to the ICC. “The U.K., 
France, Germany and U.S. spent eight hours overcoming opposition 
in the council by several countries to the ICC referral.”105 Thus, the 
ICC, on referral106 from a unanimous U.N. Security Council107 issued 
a request for an arrest warrant against Kadafi108 and the ICC 
Prosecutor opened an investigation into the crimes committed by the 
Libyan government,109 accusing the Libyan leaders110 of "planning 
and implementing  'widespread and systematic attacks against a 
civilian population, in particular demonstrators and alleged 
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dissidents'"111 - basic violations of the right to life.112  
 
2. Syria 
 
Russia and the U.S. were both willing to invoke the ICC in 
the case of Libya. The U.S. will very likely be at least as willing to 
invoke the ICC in the eventual cases that will arise out of the events 
transpiring in Syria. One can, however, wonder how Russia would 
react to a request for referral by the ICC regarding cases in Syria. 
Russia has steadfastly resisted any effort to oust Syria's leader Assad: 
"Many thousands of people have died in Syria since the uprisings 
began in March last year. Yet despite months of discussions, the 
Security Council Member States   have failed to agree on a solution. 
The ceasefire plan sponsored by former UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan has proved an unmitigated failure, leading to his resignation, 
while Russia and China continue to block efforts to refer the matter 
to the International Criminal Court (ICC) or launch military 
intervention."113 The U.S. clearly wants to hold the Assad regime 
criminally liable. [Former] "Secretary Clinton has said, 'there must 
be accountability for senior figures of the regime.'"114 However, 
without Russian support, or at least abstention, it is unlikely that an 
ICC referral would issue from the Security Council. Part of the 
negotiation of the transition in Syria should include the question of 
whether and how to invoke the ICC.  
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Conclusion 
 
As seen, the United States has much to gain and little to risk 
by deepening its connection to the ICC. Unless the U.S. ratifies the 
Rome Statute it will be dependent on the Security Council for 
referrals; since Russia or China could veto referral from the Security 
Council, it is in the U.S. interest to ratify the ICC despite any 
theoretical risk to CIA personnel or CIA contract employees. By 
working its way deeper into the ICC machinery, the U.S. has the 
chance to legitimize its foreign policy as multi-lateralist, pro-human 
rights, and to present the Putin government with a challenge to the 
"race to the top" model for the industrializing world to emulate. 
While Obama and Putin alike may see the opportunity, will they 
seize it – as they did in Libya? To some extent this depends on the 
ability of "the President's Men" to Swallow hard and stand fast. 
Senior level personnel in the CIA actively opposed the use of torture 
(unlike extraordinary rendition) because torture generates false leads, 
bad intelligence, and encourages enemy resistance. Abduction is not 
always torture and not all interrogations were torture. Professional 
intelligence personnel should interpose that objection to any claims 
of wrong-doing as an exculpating and/or mitigating factor, were they 
ever to be held accountable (which they most likely never will be) - 
c'est la guerre. 
 
